THE NEW REPUBLIC

The Two Maps

Louis J. Halle

A Conservative's Confession

Edwin L. Dale, Jr.

Possibilities for Goodness

Irving Howe

Kennedy and De Gaulle

Jean Daniel

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Are You Satisfied?

★ Every day we say the pace can't last; every day it accelerates. Now it is Khrushchev and Vienna in June and God knows what thereafter. It seems as good a time as any to take stock. We are anxiously asked: Are you satisfied with Kennedy? Well, yes and no. Here is a conscientious try at a balance sheet.

Debits: Heaviest liability is Cuba. It shook us up. It ended the honeymoon. It showed us our paragon is fallible. General feeling is that young Mr. Kennedy is permitted at least one mistake like this, and it is noted he didn't panic and handled the recovery adeptly. But cankering doubt remains. Was this an isolated mistake or a settled point of view? If the latter, we are in trouble.

Second heaviest debit, we think, is Kennedy's continued failure to take the country into his confidence, to fireside talk – to *educate*. Press conferences aren't enough. Even written messages aren't enough. We think he must talk to the nation. The country is eager to be led. It hears of "sacrifice" and doesn't know for what it should sacrifice.

We think the problem goes deeper. The US is harboring dangerous illusions, is still dozing from the Eisenhower pills. Sooner or later it must be told nasty facts that it loathes – that the UN is close to seating Red China; that the US shadow empire around the periphery of Communism (created by Dulles with the bomb monopoly) is collapsing just like the real British, French, Dutch and Portuguese colonial empires; that the leaders of our particular client states in underdeveloped areas are generally conservative and often corrupt. This story is not being told. It irks us, for example, to see Lyndon Johnson bombinating through Asia, commending Chiang Kai-shek and making large promises of doubtful validity. This obscures rather than clarifies the hard facts of life.

On the domestic side there are debits too, but these are generally of one pattern; what it boils down to is a rather sour reflection that election promises generally are downgraded and that Kennedy's fine sense of urgency seems to be slowing down in Washington's normal slough of moderation.

Having said all this what is the story on the other side; what are the assets? This is a brighter scene. We can criticize Kennedy perhaps for not going far enough but he has moved forward in a splendid array of proposals whose validity is attested by their enemies. Depressed areas, minimum wages, schools, housing, medical aid for the aged – it would take too long even to enumerate them. He is a young man not in a hurry, and yet with a steady persistence and push that promise legislative success. The very mildness of their presentation undercuts the opposition which ceaselessly proclaims (and correctly we think) that these bills are only the opening wedge. Kennedy is tightening the regulatory agencies, appointing a man like FCC Chairman Newton Minow who denounces the "wasteland" of present TV programs, and throwing moral and legal support behind civil rights (though ducking new legislation). The lobbyists of the NAM, Chamber of Commerce and AMA are hoarse testifying against Kennedy bills. They do it with the frustrating feeling that change is coming.

Get What You Can

★ Kennedy is not flamboyant. The theatrics and emotion which liberal reformers adore he detests. They love an all-out, no-compromise fight for principle and think it worth the cost even if they lose. Maybe it is. Kennedy isn't like that, he wants to win. He probably will win. Granting that Kennedy is scaling down his programs before sending them to Congress and that Congress is scaling them down a second time in the legislative process we think it fair to expect that Kennedy will get some kind of a bill for nearly every reform he is proposing.

The final balance? Answer that yourself! . . . With the exceptions noted we personally think Kennedy is doing a good job and we hope with experience he will do better.

The Aspirin Case

★ Biggest economic debate in Washington right now is whether current business recovery will bring back full employment in and of itself. Top Kennedy economist Walter Heller says it won't; former top Eisenhower economist Arthur F. Burns says it will. The public doesn't know what it's all about but the two men are delivering polite but tremendous salvos that have economists on the edge of their chairs. The uncertainty of the outcome, the novelty of the battle and the stakes involved recall the *Monitor-Merrimac* duel.

All through the campaign Kennedy argued that behind the 1960 recession lies a deeper slow-down of American economic growth. MIT professor Paul Samuelson picked it up in his pre-inaugural staff report, and it is the accepted thesis of the Administration. Then redoubtable Dr. Burns, head of the National Bureau of Economic Research last April suddenly met the charge head on – "there is no chronic slack of our economy," he said. With the facetiousness that economists affect when they are fighting with spring knives he terms the new concept "neo-stagnationism" though of "a gay and optimistic" type, he said, compared to the original dour version.

Last week Heller fired back a full broadside in New York warning once more that curing the current recession is like curing a head cold for a patient with anemia. That the recession is ending nobody can doubt. That the US has also cured three other recessions since the war and still sunk further behind the over-all rate of growth of most industrial nations, including Russia, seems to this column incontrovertible. We are, in short, at just the recovery point where Eisenhower thrice cried "Inflation," slammed on tight money brakes and cut the budget. Will we do that again now with another recession coming punctually in 1962?

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Law in Alabama

Governor Patterson of Alabama speaks of his "people," their "traditions" and their "laws." Quite likely, a majority of Alabama whites – not necessarily constituting a majority of the people of Alabama – favor continuation of the tradition of segregation, on buses as well as in schools. But the "laws" enforcing this tradition have not been law at least since May 17, 1954. And the crowd of sadists whom the Governor feels compelled to protect from federal marshals may be his people, but they are not Alabama's and not the South's.

All the amenities of federal-state relations have been observed by the Kennedy Administration, and were observed by Deputy Attorney General Byron White in his conference with the Governor on Sunday. But Governor Patterson was "not in" to the President of the United States last week. He is not amenable to amenities. He would interpose the "law" of his legislature and his local courts against the Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court, and he would bar the way to the President's discharge of his duties to see that the federal laws are faithfully executed. Of course, he cannot do that. He may resent "outsiders," but Alabama is not outside the Union.

It is probable that Attorney General Robert Kennedy's prompt and resolute action has saved the situation. In any event, it is certain that if more federal force is needed, more will be provided. There are no legal complications or even the slightest doubt about prophylactic action. Federal marshals stand ready to protect – as state authorities refused to do – the enjoyment of federal rights. Under an injunction that was issued by Judge Frank M. Johnson of the local federal district court, the rioters may be punished for contempt of court. This is all deeply regrettable, but it is unavoidable in the circumstances and within the President's authority.

Criminal prosecution of rioters under civil rights statutes dating back to the reconstruction era is also possible. But no effective long-range solution is to be found in such a course of action. The crimes with which rioters could be charged under these statutes cannot be mere breaches of peace or assault, for the public peace in general is, by the most fundamental and pervasive presupposition of our federal system, the responsibility of the state, not of the national government. Hence the charges under the Civil Rights Act must be breaches of peace with intent to deprive other citizens of their constitutional rights. This is a complex thing to put to a jury, and an Alabama jury at that. There is no swift punishment and no certain deterrent to be

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had in this fashion. And not very much can be done to make these statutes more effective.

But the power available, which is being used, is sufficient. The President and the Attorney General are determined, and they have been forehanded. The deputies now in Montgomery have had a course in riot control, and they are clearly at the ready. What must be done will be done, and all that remains to be said is that the behavior of a few has disgraced the many, that what happened in Alabama has deepened national self-doubt. For since the Sino-Soviet challenge is a moral as well as an economic and military one, our defenses are further impaired because our confidence in America's humane and egalitarian character has again been assaulted by Americans.

Nationalist Coup in Korea

On the White House agenda, "Korea Week" was to begin on Monday, May 22. The retiring Ambassador to Seoul, Walter McConaughy, recently appointed head of a special task force on Korea, was scheduled to report to the National Security Council. The President was aware that continuing political and economic stagnation after the Rhee ouster had left South Koreans in a desperate mood, but no one (and this includes the CIA) anticipated the coup staged by the five-man military junta on May 15.

Syngman Rhee was a shrewd politician who took care to give the military its due. But whereas Rhee would kick a politically unreliable officer upstairs, his less sophisticated and less confident successor, Premier Chang, brusquely purged officers of dubious loyalty. The origins of the coup, however, go back to the days of the anti-Rhee student revolt. There were portents then of possible military intervention, until the US took its firm stand against Rhee and behind Premier Chang, with his promises to invigorate the economy and crack down on corruption. Gradually, as Chang's inability to give strong leadership became plainer, as corruption got worse and North Korean propaganda began to find an increasingly sympathetic audience, the determination of certain high officers was hardened.

The economic plight of overpopulated South Korea (23 million people today and five million more projected by 1970) with its traditional dependence on an overburdened farmland has been aggravated by its artificial separation from industrialized and relatively underpopulated North Korea (nine million). Sixty-five percent of South Koreans live on the land, yet only 22 percent of the land is arable. Twenty-five percent of the labor force is unemployed – 2.5 million people – and those who have jobs work at the scratch pay characteristic of most Asian societies. When one considers that a middle-rank government official is paid $40 a month, the prevalence of corruption becomes credible. Although some of the more spectacular favoritism of the Rhee regime may have abated in the past year, the Chang regime rested on the old, pervasively corrupt political order. Literally hundreds of millions of dollars have been escaping tax annually through channels of collusion beginning at the bottom, with the underpaid tax collector, and running right up to the Finance Ministry. The key conduit was the Assembly member who could offer cooperative constituents lenient tax treatment, as well as patronage. The Finance Ministry has also drifted more and more into negotiated contracts in both civil and defense projects, as against open, competitive bidding. And nearly all of Korean coastal society is in on the smuggling of Japanese consumer goods (which accounts for the power of the invisible lobby in Seoul against normalizing economic relations with Tokyo).

No doubt disgust at the weakness of the politicians in dealing with corruption and economic decline had much to do with emboldening the junta. It can be stated on excellent authority that Army Chief of Staff Chang Do Young – who was dragooned at the eleventh hour into serving as front man for the junta – got his present post in January only when the former Chief of Staff was eased out for his refusal to permit the diversion of military funds for political purposes. In a deeper sense, however, the junta may have been driven to act by a frustration rooted essentially in pent-up Korean nationalism. Koreans have a vivid historical memory and a strong sense of national identity which has been accentuated by the postwar sweep of Asian nationalism and by dependence of the Seoul regime on a US subsidy. Significantly, the five-point program announced by the junta on May 21 included the plank: "Strive for national reunification by excelling in competition against the Communists." Syngman Rhee had talked only of "marching on the north," but the new leaders appear to have in mind a South Korea capable of bargaining with the Communists at some future date from a position of greater strength. They are, at any rate, holding out the hope of reunification.

After a decade or so of national reconstruction the South Koreans might have at least a hypothetical chance (on the strength of their population advantage) of getting reunification without surrendering to Communist domination. But this presupposes continuing US support and dedicated work by the Korean leadership, whether the military or, in time, a new civilian political grouping. It presupposes far-sighted reform, not myopic repression. The most ominous danger should the military fail in its political mission is that the demoralized armed forces might then themselves be corrupted by power and fall into a divisive struggle.

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Skepticism on the Summit

"If there is not at the summit of the nations the will to win the greatest prize and the greatest honor offered to mankind, doom-laden responsibility will fall upon those who now possess the power to decide," Sir Winston Churchill told the House of Commons eight years ago. Thenceforth the phrase "the summit" has been applied to almost any occasion where heads of governments and chiefs of state meet. The Kennedy-Khrushchev confrontation at Vienna in the first week of June is not, however, billed as an occasion for negotiation in the sense that the two leaders expect to ratify precise agreements on Berlin, Laos or a nuclear test ban. The White House has been at pains to make clear that Vienna is simply an opportunity for the two to size each other up – a phrase suggesting boxers at a weighing-in or a tailor approaching a new customer.

Doubts that have been expressed about the wisdom of a Summit meeting at this time have not been better expressed than they were on October 5 of last year by Mr. Kennedy himself: "There is no sense having a meeting unless there is some reason to hope that there will soon be some success. From the issues on which we are divided with the Soviet Union, disarmament and Berlin – which are the two chief issues at the present time, there is no indication that there is a common meeting ground. Therefore, just to meet, just to sit down, just to spend an hour, would give no sound basis for hope, particularly as Khrushchev is being extremely belligerent now. . . ."

It would be so easy in Vienna, for example, to reaffirm devotion to peace, thus arousing hopes in general that have no substance in detail. Both sides could resolve that with equal sincerity, for each undoubtedly has a vast preference for avoiding a general war. It would be so easy to affirm an agreement regarding the rights of subject peoples to independence. This is a stock affirmation of both sides. But such agreements in principle can obscure the fact of divergent interests in Laos, the Congo, Vietnam or Korea. The practical issues have to do with the future courses of the peoples projected into juridic independence, and with the claim on their future asserted by the Communists' version of Marxism-Leninism.

It would be easy to voice in common certain hopes for reducing the burden and peril of armaments – easy, that is, by avoiding a discussion of commonly-accepted means for controlling the armaments race. It might be easy even to say something about devotion to the broad purposes of the UN Charter. Each side interprets the Charter in its own way; each seeks to ensure that the organization shall be made amenable to its purposes. It would likewise be easy for the Communists to encourage the belief that the President of the United States comes to Vienna as a supplicant, smarting from a series of defeats. For all these reasons, and because this meeting will probably cast little new light on Soviet ambitions or policies, skepticism is widespread.

". . . And There's a Bad Crevasse Just Past This Ridge . . ."

The world is not waiting for the sunrise over the Wiener Wald. The President's view of Soviet designs may be in no way altered by what he sees and hears. And Mr. Khrushchev's assumptions of inevitable victory may be unmodified by assertions of America's will, resourcefulness and power. But to meet is to explore, and to explore is to learn, and the learned leader acts from knowledge, rather than illusion.

Vulnerable Iran

When Mr. Khrushchev lately told Walter Lippmann a revolution was brewing in Iran he uttered a prophecy that seers have been making for years, though it has never come true. Nor is it true this month, although the Shah has just dissolved Parliament under a new form of pressure. This was a teachers' strike that was impressive because it included a silent protest march 10,000 strong, and because its organizers prevented the Communists from making capital out of their discon-

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tent. The middle-class worm has turned.

The outcome of such protests is a new government under a liberal patrician, Dr. Ali Amini. He is well known in Washington, where he has been Ambassador, as a knowledgeable and an honest man. If, as it seems, he has agreed with the Shah to rule by decree and indefinitely to postpone election of a new Parliament, no tears need be wasted on that institution, which is packed with self-interested landowners expert at exercising the negative power of balking decisions. Dr. Amini's first act has been to announce that the treasury is empty owing to corruption and mismanagement.

This too is an old story. Picking up the tab for Iran's budget deficit has been an American pastime in many of the years since Dr. Mossadegh left the nation's finances in chaos in 1954. The effort of putting Iranian finances straight has broken the spirit of a long line of advisers, beginning with Morgan Shuster in 1910. They wilt because advice is admired but never followed.

For what Iran lacks is not plans, or good individual ministers, but team work by men with enough courage to cut out dead wood. This is easier said than done in an enormous country living under the incubus of two or three hundred powerful landowning families who successfully resist taxation and where there is a swollen civil service into which each new government funnels its supporters and from which no one is ever dismissed. Reform that is to do any good must be conducted by men resilient enough to withstand attack from the rich, and to organize alternative employment for tens of thousands of ex-clerks who do not know the meaning of the word productivity. Dr. Amini is brave, but he is not a wizard, and the Shah, although he has the right ideas, has a depressing tendency to withdraw his support from any minister who is criticized.

The Amini government is a last-chance and, as such, is bound to blackmail its allies for the economic support that alliance is supposed to bring. Last time the Shah found CENTO too cool about aid, which was in 1959, he turned to Moscow, only to present it with demands so steep that there was no agreement: Russians too find Iranians difficult. In 1907 the British met the perennial Iranian problem by agreeing with the Czar to divide the country into spheres of influence. This technique is out of date, but how about spheres of aid? A neutral Iran would be better than a tottering client.

The Migrant Worker

The plight of the migrant farm worker has broken into the news again. Testifying before a House Labor Subcommittee in New York City, a Puerto Rican laborer complained of poor treatment and low wages at the New Jersey Farm Bureau's "model" labor camp at Glassboro, New Jersey. This installation is regarded, in commercial farm circles, as one of the most enlightened operations to be found anywhere within the United States. It boasts of an infirmary with a full-time doctor in attendance, for instance, to provide medical care for the migrants. The housing is supplied with running water and is said to compare favorably with the slum tenements that so many Puerto Rican workers must put up with in New York. Nevertheless, the witness showed a series of pay envelopes which indicated that his gross wages were at the rate of 80 cents an hour; after deductions for transportation, meals and lodging he had practically nothing left. As Sen. Paul H. Douglas recently said, "The migratory workers are the lowest paid, the most insecure, the most poorly housed, the most socially declassed and the most ignored [because] there is no political mileage in defending them."

Transition in Kenya

Anxious to prepare Kenya for as painless a transition to independence as possible – and spurred on by memories of the savage Mau Mau uprisings of 1953-54, the British Government in February, 1960, granted the Kenyans a new constitution designed to give the Africans a substantial governing role. National elections were held in February of this year and a new Cabinet has just been formed in which Africans hold four out of 12 ministries. Unlike neighboring Tanganyika, however, where Africans are cooperating with one another and with the British in ending colonial tutelage, Kenya's nationalists are divided and distrust of British intentions is mounting.

One cause of the growing strife has been the status of nationalist patriarch Jomo Kenyatta, the alleged (though never proved) organizer of the Mau Mau, who has been held in forced residence by the British since 1952. Following the February elections, British Governor General Sir Patrick Renison told the Africans, who were demanding Kenyatta's release, that he would free the 71-year-old leader as soon as a government was formed and was functioning smoothly. Both Tom Mboya's Kenya African National Union and Ronald Ngala's Kenya African Democratic Union, however, made the release of Kenyatta the condition for their participation in a government. Weeks of wrangling followed during which Sir Patrick, who enjoys calling himself "a bit of an old Dictator," pointedly reminded the Kenyans that unless they yielded by mid-May, the deadline for the formation of a government, he would have to rule the country by decree. After some hasty negotiations, it was announced at the end of April that a "compromise" had been struck between Sir Patrick and Mr. Ngala. The latter agreed to form a Cabinet in

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conjunction with Michael Blundell and the New Kenya Party, a white liberal group which hopes to evolve in Kenya the same sort of racial cooperation found in Tanganyika. In return, the British promised to contruct a new home for Kenyatta in the suburbs of Nairobi and to move him there as quickly as possible.

This arrangement might be regarded as a victory for British pragmatism and African reasonableness were it not that Sir Patrick has done little to hide his desire to curb the influence of Mboya, and to rule the country through stooges. Ngala's party – organized, like most African parties, mainly along tribal lines – obtained merely one-third of the national vote, and received 14 out of 19 seats in the Legislative Council only because the British gerrymandered the voting districts. And whereas its apparent moderation on the racial issue might seem to make it the better party to lead Kenya to full independence, it bears the stigma of being willing to make *sub rosa* deals with the British in order to obtain a few offices.

Mboya, now deprived of a chance to play a constructive role in Kenya politics during a crucial transition period, has sullenly declared his all-out opposition to the new government, and his followers are powerful enough to stymie action whenever they wish. Having visited the United States many times, Mboya has enjoyed a fruitful relationship with President Kennedy, labor leaders and other influential Americans interested in seeing the African countries achieve independence by non-violent means. Through Mboya's efforts numerous students and unionists have been brought to America, and last fall the Joseph Kennedy Foundation airlifted several hundreds of students to the United States. Now, however, Mboya may be forced to adopt a more extremist position if he wishes to retain even the effective leadership of his own party. For his leftist rival within his own party, Oginga Odinga – who reputedly has received as much money from Communist Chinese sources as Mboya has received from Americans – has been agitating for any measures whatsoever to oust the British as quickly as possible.

Small Weapons Lag

Everybody knows the Russians are ahead of the US in the design of heavy space vehicles. What is less understood is that we are lagging as badly, in some cases even worse, in almost the entire range of weaponry, not only the larger types of armament such as cannon, howitzers and tanks, but also in the footslogger's rifle. Our NATO allies have adopted, for instance, a Belgian automatic weapon for infantry. And when it comes to guerrilla warfare, the Israeli "machine pistol" known as the Uzi, the Russian AK and the British Sterling are all far better than the heavy Garand which is still the closest thing in the US armory to a light, easily transported weapon (the awful truth is that the US does not at the moment have an approved assault rifle; the new M-14 is still in the experimental stage).

The trouble at the Pentagon is what the military professionals call the long "lead-time" from the development of a new design on paper to its actual production in concrete form. Seemingly, the size of our military bureaucracy imposes a built-in caution – but is it only size? Instead of novelty and innovation the Pentagon bureaucracy is engaged in refining the details of devices whose prototypes were approved 10 or 15 or even more than 20 years ago. In this vast military collective the sense of progress is normally maintained – without stepping on anybody's toes – by striving to produce "nothing but the best." As in the automobile business, that often means the old model with a new look.

Brazil Under Quadros

Last week President Quadros of Brazil reiterated his opposition "to any foreign intervention, direct or indirect, to impose on Cuba any given form of government"; yet he has pointedly refused to break with Castro. For this reluctance there are reasons. One of the foundation stones of Brazil's new foreign policy is friendship and trade with all nations, with the twofold purpose of expanding Brazil's exports to replace complete reliance on coffee and to enable Brazil to contribute to world peace by reverting to its old (and successful) role of conciliator and mediator. Thus, Quadros has declared that he does not intend to "ignore the reality, the vitality, and the dynamism" of the Communist bloc; but he has also warmly welcomed Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and accepted the International Monetary Fund terms for economic aid which his predecessor had rejected.

Quadros must likewise take into account potential *Fidelistas* in his own Northeast: the 10 million undernourished, under-everything *Nordestinos* of the drought and flood-ridden states of the hump of Brazil now being organized into Peasant Leagues by State Deputy (of Pernambuco) Francisco Juliao, who has just published a novel dramatizing the plight of the landless, foodless and moneyless peoples in that area.

Kennedy and his advisers have wisely chosen not to make an issue of Brazil's preference for non-alignment; and on his forthcoming goodwill tour Adlai Stevenson will no doubt reaffirm US sympathy for Quadros' course. Douglas Dillon and A. A. Berle, Jr., have brought an end to the Eisenhower-imposed ban on further loans to Brazil and promised to consider credits even for Petrobras, the government's ailing oil monop-

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oly. The US has given Quadros 100,000 tons of the sugar quota taken from Cuba, and agreed to deliver one million tons of surplus wheat with repayment in *cruzeiros* over the next 40 years. To tide Brazil over her short-term foreign exchange crisis, a US-sponsored $2 billion combination of moratoriums and new loans will be signed this month by this country, six Western European nations, and Japan.

These props, however, may not prove sturdy enough to bear the weight of the country's sagging economy. There has been a frightening jump in the cost of living. Labor unrest is rising. Despite the rapid industrialization of the Sao Paulo region, Brazil's 68 million people are still dependent on agricultural exports, with coffee furnishing 60 percent of foreign exchange. Brazil is now holding more than two years' supply off the market, with enormous new plantations coming into production; competition from Africa, the new European Common Market tariff wall, and growing American preference for soluble coffee (which yields more cups from the same quantity of beans) make the near-term prospects rather bleak.

"THE EXPRESSION 'YOUNG MAN' IS NOT NECESSARILY FLATTERING"

Kennedy and De Gaulle

Paris

As the date of May 30 grows ever closer, so too do the circumstances of President Kennedy's meeting with General de Gaulle become increasingly changed. Casting our minds back two months, when the design behind the journey to Paris was conceived, we can recall that the United States wished to vest this first venture of the new President abroad with special significance. The visit was to represent the homage paid by a young Chief of State to one of the survivors of the four great statesmen of World War II. It was to be symbolic of the importance which the leaders of the Atlantic Alliance attached to the French position within NATO. And finally, it was to be an affirmation of the fact that the new American Administration, in principle deeply anxious to have an East-West interchange and a new departure toward the underdeveloped world, had, nevertheless, not forgotten Europe.

At that time, what did John F. Kennedy represent to General de Gaulle? He had emerged as champion of an electoral campaign, the various stages of which the President of the French Republic had followed with admiration on television. He had the film of the four big Kennedy-Nixon TV debates sent to him and followed attentively in one of the private assembly-rooms of the Elysée Palace. John F. Kennedy was also a former Senator who had made himself famous by a resounding speech in favor of the independence of Algeria. And finally, Kennedy had no past: he had not lived through the days which had constituted the glory of Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill and de Gaulle. The President of the French Republic did not, perhaps, harbor any great admiration for the political virtues of General Eisenhower; but he did not forget that the latter was the Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces in 1943. De Gaulle refers spontaneously to the "young man" who is presiding over the destiny of the North American nation. On the lips of an illustrious elder statesman, the expression "young man" is not necessarily a flattering one.

Since that time, a series of events has intervened. First of all, there was the initial halting of the Evian conversations between the French and the Algerians. On April 7, the Algerians of the GPRA (Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic) decided, contrary to what had been agreed upon, not to go to Evian. Immediately, the United States decided, in turn, to become concerned at this refusal. This was done with an unaccustomed fanfare of publicity which served the United States' interests well in Africa, but which did it a great deal of harm in official French circles, where official mores require a refusal to tolerate foreign intervention in domestic matters. The Ambassador of the United States to Tunis, Mr. Warmsley, received – on instructions from Washington – two ministers of the GPRA and a news release was published on the outcome of this meeting. No doubt the American Administration had many excuses – excuses which, moreover, were perfectly understandable to French liberals: the popularity quotient of the West in Africa is so low (principally because of the Algerian War) that President Kennedy's representatives could very well deem it useful to consult ministers on whom France had already conferred recognition in fact by having invited them to the Evian discussions. It is possible that other inten-

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tions also motivated the minds of those who decided on the rapprochement between the United States and the FLN (Algerian National Liberation Front). In any event, this is what General de Gaulle believed, and he was extremely irritated by it.

De Gaulle told himself that President Kennedy rushed a bit too precipitately to the rescue of the Franco-Algerian negotiation, and was somewhat overhasty in emphasizing the difficulties of France and the possible need the French Government might have of its Western allies. This, at a time when France is demanding independence of operation within NATO, a sharing of atomic secrets, and participation in all East-West conferences instead of a Soviet-American tête-à-tête. It was de Gaulle's belief that "young President Kennedy" wished to arrive in Paris in a position to deal from strength. The General had no reason to be overjoyed by this.

And then came the ill-starred Cuban venture. Inured as he is to take a broad and far-sighted view of events, the President of the French Republic could scarcely fail to sense that this blow to the United States affected the West as a whole, and even that a defeat of this sort was not going to facilitate the future association of Algeria with a western France. However, it is also possible that he may have felt some slight satisfaction at the idea that the presumptuousness of the dynamic "young man" had been slightly deflated by the turn of events. At the Elysée Palace some harsh remarks were made on the confidence which President Kennedy had placed in information services which were so misguided as to have sold the notion that a single intervention in Cuba would suffice to defeat Castro.

And finally, there was the affair of the Algerian generals' putsch. To the vast irritation of the Americans in Paris, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to deny officially that CIA agents had encouraged Generals Challe, Zeller, Salan and Jouhaud, who failed but by little to drag France into civil war and a military dictatorship. The book on this affair has been written and still the conclusions to be drawn from it are not clear. However, it has left in its wake a serious malaise on both sides. On General de Gaulle's side, in any case, there appears to be a conviction that the insurgent generals had counted on the difficulties which France is creating at the present time in NATO to defeat the French Republic with, if not active American support, at least her passive complicity. And from what elements in the US would such complicity come? In France, there is something of a tendency to judge American policy in the light of the domestic situation in France, and from the French viewpoint, the Pentagon and the CIA are separated automatically from the Administration, just as in France Mr. Debré is separated from General de Gaulle. But the President of the French Republic could easily have thought that Mr. Kennedy would have been most happy to succor the de Gaulle regime in an eleventh-hour rescue operation.

And so, it is clear, the prevailing state of mind is not the most cordial. One must also take into account the characteristic traits of this veritable giant, de Gaulle – a man as anachronistic as he is fascinating. For him, France comes first, next Europe, and then a vague shadowy concept of humanity which has no future except to the extent that it is loyal to Europe and to France. When he speaks of America, he says: "that daughter of Europe." When he thinks of Americans, he thinks of them almost as bastards of old England who were only saved by an injection of French civilization. De Gaulle's Europe, moreover, is a rather broad concept. In any event, it overleaps all ideologies. And it includes Russia "temporarily bowed under the Communist yoke." When de Gaulle learned of Gagarin's successful venture into space, he sent Khrushchev the following really astonishing cable: "I am proud for Europe!"

JEAN DANIEL

Confession of a One-Time Conservative

It is always a kind of macabre pleasure to confess error. As a one-time conservative in the United States who has lived a while in the extraordinary economic atmosphere of Western Europe, I should like to indulge the pleasure.

The dazzingly simple lesson from Western Europe appears to me this:

The way to achieve the best of all possible economic worlds (rapid economic growth, full employment, stable prices, favorable balance of payments, more investment, no recessions, more consumption, better living standards) is to spend as much government money as possible, and make sure that the amount the government spends rises rapidly each year.

The reason for this is not that government spending is inherently better than private spending, though that may be true. The reason is that a very high level of government spending, *no matter where the money*

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goes, assures a very high level of demand. And a high level of demand is the open sesame to everything else.

It means full employment. It gives the incentive for more investment in plant and equipment. It means operation of plants at efficient level, and thus at lower costs. Therefore, it means relatively stable prices and competitiveness in export markets. It permits higher wages without inflation as productivity rises rapidly. And, *mirabile dictu*, it permits the government to spend more and more each year without raising taxes because the economy, and thus receipts, is growing as fast as the government spending.

Let us look for a moment at the "economic miracle" of Germany. Its creators have misled the world about it. Dr. Erhard says it came about because Germany let loose the creative forces of private enterprise and rejected "statism" and "dirigism." True enough, and perhaps that helped. But what Dr. Erhard does not say is that West German taxes and spends (and elects and elects) 34 percent of the gross national product – the highest in the non-Communist world. This figure compares with only 26 percent in the US, state and local taxes and spending included in both cases. By the test of the National Association of Manufacturers, or even the Committee for Economic Development, West Germany is not conservative but radical.

Now let us look at the one laggard in continental industrial Europe. *It is Belgium. Belgium spends only* 23 percent of its GNP through government. It doesn't tax, it doesn't spend – and it doesn't grow.

Britain is the other laggard in this part of the world. It spends only 28 percent. More important, it is constantly taking measures to restrict demand, through high interest rates or consumer credit control or changes in the tax-spending equation of the budget. It let demand run free – actually pumped it up – only once in the last five years, and only then did its economy perform brilliantly. France, Sweden and Austria have practically nothing in common except one thing: They spend, and they grow.

Outside of Belgium, there is only one nation in industrial Europe, Denmark, where government spending is a smaller proportion of GNP than in the US. It is a special case, with an unusually heavy concentration of agriculture in the total economy.

It seems reasonably clear to me that when government spends as much as it does here in Europe, business is good and stays good. And when business is good, a lot of other problems just go away. For example, there is very little fuss here in Europe about "technological unemployment" – fortunately, because it means that Europe can and does automate merrily away with all the resulting advantages for productivity, costs and the like.

Now a couple of qualifications. They do not change the main point, but they should at least be made.

The first is that there must be some reasonable relation between government receipts and spending. Many governments in Europe run chronic "deficits" in their budgets by American accounting standards – which helps account for their success – but they cannot safely permit spending to run away from receipts without inflationary trouble. France showed that before 1958. European governments spend enormously – but they also tax enormously.

The second concerns the "mix" of taxation. Judging strictly from results – and leaving out the theory – it seems that there is great merit in "soaking the poor." This is not as harsh as it sounds.

What it means in practice in Western Europe is far greater reliance than in the United States (or Britain) on a set of taxes that indirectly hit the poor man hardest: excise and sales taxes of all kinds, turnover taxes, tax-on-value-added, heavy employer social security contributions. These taxes are collected in prices, and thus from consumers. They do not "raise prices" unless they are increased; once imposed, they are practically painless. But they do soak the poor, relatively; no government in Western Europe relies nearly as much as the United States on taxes for its revenues.

A final point. Why isn't very high government spending, and the resulting constantly high pitch of demand, "inflationary"? *The answer is: It is inflationary*, but only very mildly so now, in contrast with the first seven or eight years after World War II when there was a worldwide chronic excess of demand over supply. European prices have risen, as American prices have risen. Since the Korean War, however, European prices on the whole have risen no faster than American, and in some cases they have risen less, despite much higher government spending. And in neither Europe nor America has there been any significant inflation since mid-1957.

The point is that the world now has a large and elastic supply to meet higher demand; thus it is a world in which demand can not only be profitably increased but, within reasonable limits, safely increased.

Unless appearances – and hard facts and figures – are grossly misleading, the lesson in all this for America is clear:

Raise federal government spending as rapidly as possible to $100 billion (*i.e.* $120 billion on a cash basis) and make sure it rises at least $4 billion a year.

Count on more rapid economic growth to provide the receipts for most of this increase in spending – and do not worry about fairly large deficits for a while until there is full employment again – and raise consumer taxes eventually to cover the rest.

Then sit back and start enjoying real prosperity again.

EDWIN L. DALE, JR.

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The Two Maps

by Louis J. Halle

What my friend Harry Simple claims, as I understand him, is that the Soviet Union is not really a Marxist state or a Communist state or anything like that. Although dressed up in the Marxist terminology, he says, it's still just the old Russian autocracy, which was modeled on the Byzantine Empire back in the days of Ivan the Great. He claims that, just as Ivan then thought Russia was historically destined to become the third and final Rome (by which he meant it was destined to rule the world), so Khrushchev thinks today. Harry doesn't believe that Khrushchev represents Karl Marx's movement for the emancipation of the world's toiling masses. He doesn't believe Moscow's objective really is to liberate the workers of the world and then "wither away." He thinks its objective is to become the Third Rome.

Of course, if you put it that way it sounds good. But it also sounds like saying that the Communists aren't Communists, and if *they* aren't I want to know who is.

Harry's answer is that "Communism" is a name, not a thing. You can put it on anything you want, just like a hat that you can put on anybody's head.

If you press him, he admits it's not quite as simple as that. For instance, he admits that if the Pope in the Vatican should call his religion "Marxist" or "Communist" (if he should put on that hat), no one would believe him. This is because the Roman Catholic Church has no historic association with Karl Marx or the Communist movement of Marx's day. But it is possible to trace a continuous line of historical development from Marx to Lenin and from Lenin to Khrushchev. Therefore Khrushchev can say, as the Pope could not, that he inherited the hat. But what the hat covers today is just as different from what it covered in Marx's day as the Pope is different from Marx.

Harry says we put ourselves at a disadvantage by identifying Moscow's challenge as the challenge of Marx's Communism instead of as what it really is, the old-fashioned challenge of an expanding empire. "Marxism" and "Communism" and "Socialism" and the rest may be bad words to us, but they appeal to half-educated intellectuals all over the world, being historically identified with the aim of liberating the people from their brutal capitalist exploiters, and that sort of thing. When we identify Khrushchev with Marx we ennoble the image of Khrushchev, he says, more than we degrade the image of Marx. We make Khrushchev look like the champion of the disenfranchised masses against us exploiters.

Harry will admit, if you pin him down, that the threat of what he calls the Third Rome does have an ideological element. But he regards it as a sort of standard element. He says that any struggle between an imperialist power and those who are trying to hold it off is a struggle that involves the ideological issue of servitude *versus* freedom. He will even grant that the issue is intensified, in the present case, by Moscow's contempt of the individual and of the values on which our civilization is based. But these are merely aggravations of the basic threat, which is that of a Third Rome.

Dropping in on me the other evening, and making himself at home, Harry proceeded, in his usual abrupt way, to resume our previous discussions of the subject. "By identifying what we are opposing as an ideological movement," he said, "rather than as an expanding autocracy, we mislead ourselves. We tie ourselves to a false world view, thereby denying ourselves the opportunities for coping with it a true view could reveal."

"What are you talking about?" I asked.

"Let me read you something from an old State Department press-release," he continued, fishing in his pockets till he found it. "It's the text of an address televised to the nation by the Honorable John Foster Dulles in January, 1953, six days after he had assumed office as Secretary of State. Listen to this:

> " 'Now already our proclaimed enemies control one-third of all the people of the world. I've here behind me a map which shows the vast area which stretches from Kamchatka near Alaska, the northern islands of Japan and right on to Germany in the center of Europe. That's an area which the Russian Communists completely dominate. In that area are 800 million people and they are being forged into a vast weapon of fighting power backed by industrial production and modern weapons that include atomic bombs. If this block of 800 million people is compared with our population, about 150 million people, it means that if we were alone against them, the population odds against us and in their favor would be 7 to 1. . . . At the end of the Second World War, only a little over seven years ago, they only controlled

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With this article, Louis J. Halle *ends his three-part dialogue with Harry Simple.*

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about 200 million people, and today, as I say, they control 800 million people'."

"It's perfectly clear," I said, "that Mr. Dulles was describing the expanding Russian empire. He was anticipating your advice."

"Look again," Harry replied. "You'll see that Mr. Dulles was, in effect, accepting the ideological claim of the people in Moscow – the claim that the Communist world is one. The area on the map behind him, which he referred to as having fallen under Moscow's complete domination, was not the area called 'Russia' or the area called 'China' or the two together: it was a single area called 'Communism'. Taking the nominal for the real, he assumed that the 600 million people in China had been incorporated with the 200 million in Russia to form a single movement that allowed of no distinction between them. The area had become one ideological empire, with Moscow as its capital, and the old national boundary between what had been two separate states, in the unregenerate days before Communism's triumph, was now erased.

The Transition to National Communism

"There really was no excuse for accepting this myth that Communism was above country by the date of Mr. Dulles' speech. It ought to have been evident by that time that the international Communist movement, in the course of its accommodation to the real world, was breaking up into national Communist movements. This change from international to national Communism had begun in Russia when Lenin, in an unexpected emergency, moved to put international Communism at the service of the Russian state. When Stalin carried this to the point where it became permanent, the consequences were bound to be immense. Hitherto, Moscow had been able to claim the allegiance of workers' movements in all countries on the grounds that it represented the interests of what was a single world-wide working-class, without distinction of nationality. But it could no longer expect to hold that allegiance as it became evident that what Moscow had really come to represent was the national interests of the Russian state. Its own nationalism was bound to provoke a counter-nationalism among the Communist movements in other countries.

"This should have been understood among us, by the time Mr. Dulles spoke, if only because a dramatic demonstration of it had already been given in the nationalistic rebellion of Yugoslavia, a nominally Communist country, against the nationalistic demands of Soviet Russia. Once that demonstration had been given, it should have been evident that the Communist world was, intrinsically, just as divided as the non-Communist world – and on the same nationalistic lines. It should also have been evident that this radically altered the whole situation, making the prospects of the non-Communist world far more hopeful than they could otherwise have been. It opened up new opportunities to our policy that we should have seen and seized."

"How about our policy on Yugoslavia?" I asked.

"I was just going to mention that as the brilliant exception. Here the break between the two Communist countries had become overt, or almost, before we moved. But we did see the opportunity in time, and we did move. This was a triumph of intelligence over ideology that, unfortunately, was not to be repeated. You recall that there were those in Washington who opposed any cooperation with Tito's Yugoslavia on the grounds that it bore the Communist label. The enemy, for them, was an ideology rather than a state. But there were also those who saw that what we were opposing primarily was the imperialism of the Russian state, and they were unwilling to see us refuse cooperation with Yugoslavia toward that end because of the ideological label it wore. In the light of subsequent history, their victory is remarkable."

"By 'subsequent history'," I said, "I suppose you mean the China business."

"Precisely. The completion of the Chinese Revolution came right after Yugoslavia's demonstration of the implications of that Russian nationalism to which Stalin had made the Communist movement secondary. The Chinese Revolution bore the Communist label, partly because that was the respectable label for a revolution to bear in the eyes of extremists; but it might just as well have been called 'Maoism' or some such thing instead. It was even less Communist, in the classical sense of the term, than Russia's Communism. In fact, it was such a strange brand of Communism that the Russians themselves found it hard to accept. I know of no reason to doubt Molotov's sincerity when he spoke contemptuously of the so-called Chinese Communists, referring to them as mere 'agrarian reformers' rather than Communists. So far from their triumph having represented the conquest of China by Russia, they had had to make their own way into power, half the time against the opposition of Moscow, which regarded their movement with misgivings. I have no doubt that these misgivings were nourished by the demonstration the Chinese Communists had given, since long before their achievement of power, that they were not willing to accept Moscow's domination.

"By the time they came to power, however, we Americans had lost our senses. We had been frightened by the ideological myth. We had become obsessed with a word, with a name. What we saw on our maps, where the names of 'Russia' and 'China' had once been, was now the one dread name, 'Communism'. Those who

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tried to point out that this picture was too simple were hounded out of the government, disgraced, their careers ruined. All real debate and discussion of China policy was cut off. So our government was bound to an unnecessary policy, in Korea and Formosa, that pushed China into the arms of Russia, foreclosing for an indefinite time any hope of continuing the traditional separation between the two."

Harry paused, and I must say I was too frightened by the "controversial" character of his remarks even to voice an objection for the moment.

"In philosophical terms," he continued at last, "the question is which of two nominal concepts – which of two maps, if you will – best fits the political geography as it really is. One map shows a single area from the Adriatic to the China Sea, which is labeled, simply, 'Communism'. The other shows the same area broken up into variegated pieces that are labeled 'Albania', 'Yugoslavia', 'Poland', 'Russia', 'China' and so forth. If, like Mr. Dulles, we accept the first of these maps as representing the truth, then we shall have one foreign policy, and that a highly limited foreign policy. If we accept the second, then we shall have a different foreign policy, a foreign policy of broader scope, based on prospects and opportunities the existence of which the first map doesn't admit."

Shifting Balances

"All this," I said, "strikes me as mighty abstract and theoretical."

"Very well," he said, "let me suggest its practical application. If the first map is right, then about half the population of the globe has become a single instrument in the hands of Moscow, serving Moscow's objective of completing its 'world revolution' by establishing its dominion over the remaining half. That remaining half, on the other hand, is utterly divided, most of it being neutral, while we with our little population try to lead a loose coalition of chiefly European nations in resistance to it. If this is the real situation, then we are close to the point where we must make a choice between suicide and surrender. Our only hope is to hold the Communist empire, as best we can, within the limits it has already attained – if necessary, by the sheer threat of 'massive retaliation' even for limited aggression. However desperate the prospect of using military force over Laos, we shall have to do it. We may have to land our own military forces in Cuba as well, even though it makes Cuba our Algeria, even though the political consequences might involve us, at last, in trying to hold down the whole of Latin America by force, even though we should lose the rest of the world to gain Cuba.

"I might say it is this first map many of our military use, and that often makes their advice dangerous. However, if the other map is the right one, then we live in an entirely different world, a world that is complex and fluid, a world in which all sorts of political shifts and combinations are possible at any time. A country that is on one side today may go over to the other side tomorrow, and go neutral the next day – as Yugoslavia has done. Laos might be in the Russian camp for a while, then in the Chinese camp, then in our own – whatever ideological label it happened to bear.

"In such a world the prospect that Cuba would become a permanent ally or satellite of Moscow, whatever label it wore, would be inconceivable. All the considerations of communications and logistics would make dependence on the Soviet Union so onerous and precarious for Cuba that the Cubans themselves could never accept it as final. It would be possible only as a transitory expedient.

"Such a world as the second map depicts is a world of constantly shifting balances and alignments in which no advance, whether on our side or the other, is final. The Soviet Union, which today is unable to maintain, even over Albania, that 'complete domination' which Mr. Dulles credited it with having over China, would find its maintenance impossible in South America – even over South American dictatorships that had chosen to call themselves Communist. Just as the United States allied itself with Communist Russia to fight the Nazi threat in World War II, so one can imagine a Communist Brazil allied with the United States to keep the Soviet Union out of our common Hemisphere.

"If I were the President of the United States, before I decided to resort to desperate action in either Laos or Cuba, I should want to be clear on which of the two maps was right. And if I came to the conclusion that the second map was right – as, trust me, I should – then I would reshape the foreign policy that had been based on the first map, and I would undertake the re-education of my government accordingly. I would have Mr. Dulles' map taken down from the walls of all departments. I would liberate our foreign policy from it."

He fell silent.

"Even for you, Harry," I said at last, "this has been a long lecture. I've forgotten – what were we talking about when it began?"

"I was saying that, in the context of a Cold War, ideology is merely dust in our eyes."

"If you don't believe in ideology," I asked, "then what the devil do you believe in?"

"I believe in the potential dignity of the individual man, and the need to respect it. It's the big ideologies labeled for export that I don't believe in."

I don't hold with most of what Harry says, but every now and then he says something that seems to me at least worth chewing on.

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"Onscrew the Onscrewtable"

By the time these lines meet the reader's eye Mr. Kennedy already will have decided to meet or not to meet Mr. Khrushchev face to face; but at this writing he is still weighing the matter, and that permits a superficial observer to say in advance what should be said about his decision, which is, no comment.

A superficial observer may legitimately comment only on what is in the open, known of all men, or at least of all who read the newspapers. If he is privy to the secrets of the great he is no longer superficial and may set up as a pundit, asserting without reservation that Mr. Kennedy is right or wrong. But no such assertion is possible here because this observer has been entrusted with none of the esoterica of government, still less with the President's private estimate of his own capacity.

Yet upon that estimate must hang the decision whether to talk or not to talk. To talk without accomplishing anything would be a foolish waste of time and money; to talk only to make bad matters worse would be more than foolish, it would be blameworthy; yet only by talking to some purpose can we hope to improve the present situation. If Mr. Kennedy feels that he can say something effective, he should by all means speak out; but he alone can say how he feels.

At that, he may be mistaken, for the success of any dialogue is dependent upon both participants. Mr. Khrushchev, also, must desire to talk to some purpose if any good is to result from the exchange; and if Mr. Kennedy can be certain of that, then he is such a soothsayer as that fabled Southern divine who promised his congregation to "onscrew the onscrewtable." Thus far, he has advanced no such claim. At best, therefore, his decision must be a terrific gamble.

During the Eisenhower Administration no enthusiasm was ever discovered in this place for summit talks for the simple reason that Eisenhower obviously had no idea what to say. That is not obviously true of President Kennedy. Still, it is by no means obvious that he knows how, or that he can know how to answer the question that Khrushchev will never ask, but that nevertheless will be in the back of his mind.

That question is, "If we should mutually agree on no further aggression on either side, could you be trusted to keep that agreement in case I got into trouble with China?" Could Mr. Kennedy, or any President of the United States, answer that in the affirmative? It is to say the least doubtful that he could answer it in such a way as to be believed. It is doubtful that he could believe it himself, and it is certain that a great many Americans would not only disbelieve but would violently resent any such pledge if a President made it.

Mr. Kennedy may be absolutely certain in his own mind that he intends no aggression against any peaceably-disposed nation. But Mr. Kennedy is sure to be President for four years only and he cannot bind his successor. Suppose that successor should be Nixon? Does any American seriously believe that he can predict the course of that slippery individual? Or even if Mr. Nixon should himself be convinced that the agreement should be kept, could he control the elements in his own party – strongly reinforced by belligerent Democrats – who have been clamoring for a showdown with Russia these many years?

The flat truth is, Kennedy cannot answer that fundamental question. Nobody can answer it because nobody can be sure that this nation will not fall under the spell of some more intelligent and more powerful McCarthy. Mr. Kennedy is in an exceptionally bad position to try to answer it because the blunders of the previous Administration, mainly, but not entirely, in connection with the U-2 incident and Cuba, have sharply undercut the value of the pledged word of the United States of America.

Conversation, then, must be confined to collateral issues, some of which can be settled, or at least adjusted without touching the basic question. This is certainly worth doing, and if Mr. Kennedy feels that he can do it better and sooner by a face-to-face talk than through conventional diplomatic processes, it is plainly his duty to try. But the decision rests with him, and nobody else can say that he is right or wrong until we know how it all comes out. He can't be sure himself.

One could wish, though, that the last four months had given Mr. Kennedy's backers a rather more specific answer to the Russians' question, "Exactly what do you want, anyway?" Secretary Rusk's dictum that "Communism is not negotiable" is as cloudy and obscure as the Russians' own declarations. It could mean anything or nothing, and men are slow to take to the barricades on an uncertainty. It leaves us able to hope, but hardly to whoop for the President.

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Possibilities for Goodness

by Irving Howe

"Is it possible," Albert Camus once asked, "to become a saint without believing in God? That is the sole concrete problem worth considering nowadays." It is a problem likely to trouble anyone who reflects upon the story of Danilo Dolci, one of the truly redemptive stories of our time; but as Camus would have acknowledged, such reflection may well persuade us to reshape the intent of his question.

Danilo Dolci, then a young architect, came to Western Sicily in 1952 to study classical antiquities, but was so appalled by the misery of the land that he decided to remain there and share the lot of the poorest among the Sicilian poor. Dolci was not a social worker,

Outlaws
by Danilo Dolci
(Orion; $4.95)

nor a religious missionary, nor an agent of a "vanguard" political party: he was simply a man ready to confront human suffering in its irreducible certainty. During the war he had been a pacifist and later had written some religious poetry, but in recent years he has apparently moved toward an outlook of secular humaneness.

Settling in the Palermo region, the most poverty-stricken and bandit-ridden in all Sicily, Dolci served not as propagandist or ideologue but as friend. The lessons Pietro Spina learned so painfully in Silone's *Bread and Wine* came easily to Dolci, for he had no preconceived system of ideas to shake off – he cared only to help the poor find work and lift themselves to a minimal level of awareness. On one side of himself, Dolci was an utterly practical man. He was quite prepared to employ modern sociological techniques to document the plight of the Sicilians and the need for specific projects, such as dams, that might improve their life. As he organized the peasants into informal communities, he was equally prepared to disrupt their traditional folkways by introducing modern technology – indeed, he seems happily free from those touches of sentimental crankiness which often mar American communitarians.

But there *are* sides to his character so remarkable that one finds oneself turning to Camus' question about saintliness. For together with his ordinariness of speech and manner, his utter lack of mystic or charismatic pretension, there was in Dolci a strain of pure devotedness. He was of this earth and this flesh, yet in order to stir the Sicilian government into action for the starving he went on a ten-day fast that brought him close to death. ("If, by living, I cannot arouse people's love, by dying, I will arouse their remorse.")

Meanwhile he helped the peasants and workers of Partinico – another of those places Christ neglected to visit – gain a sense of themselves as men of worth. He began with the children, treating them with a simple – but revolutionary – courtesy. He set up nursery schools, and this was especially important because a great many of the men, having turned bandit from desperation and then been caught by the police, were now in jail and their children were drifting about, unfed and unschooled. He organized a "People's University" with lectures and concerts. In 1956 he began his "strike in reverse," a scheme by which the unemployed, without promise of pay and as a token of their will to live, began repairing an old road. For this affront to the majesty of the Sicilian state, he was jailed for 50 days.

Dolci's main achievement, however, was not a particular act; it was the moral aura, the quality of feeling, he brought with him. For some decades now all political movements except the Communist have lost or never discovered the ability to stir large numbers of people into independent social action, and when the Communists do it, they care only to subdue their followers to the designs of the party. Dolci, by contrast, was able to rouse from apathy and cynicism a group of peasants who learned to think for themselves, becoming not his followers but his comrades.

Just because this seems so exemplary an achievement, one feels some annoyance with the two books that have appeared under his signature, *Report from Palermo* in 1959 and now *Outlaws*. Both books are packed with valuable information, not merely in Dolci's occasional writings, which tend to be scrappy and impatient, but in lengthy autobiographies of the peasants apparently taken from their own spoken accounts. The editing of these books, however, is painfully inept. At no point are we told by whom or how the narratives were recorded, whether they were later "edited," and whether the peasants were able to hear or read the final versions. No effort is made to present the material in some sort of historical or conceptual framework. And all kinds of information are unavailable: how did the political parties react to Dolci? the Church? the Mafia?

Nevertheless, the material in *Outlaws* is so important that it should be studied by everyone concerned with European society. The relation of poverty to crime, the role of the Mafia as a substate both subjecting and "protecting" the poor, the desperate sense of honor that emerges from the peasant narratives – all remind one of narratives by Silone and Carlo Levi. Here, for example, is a passage from a peasant-turned-bandit who describes his feelings upon being sentenced to 20 years in jail:

> "In the days that followed, I called upon God to come to my help. 'No! God cannot exist,' I said to myself,

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'for if He did He would surely have heard my children's prayers, even if He did not hear my own.' I cursed and swore at everything, even at myself, at Fate and all that kept me alive; for about eight days I was a complete atheist."

Before the pathos of that last clause, the impulse to analysis must fade and the wish to praise seem superfluous.

Dolci's movement has by now won international notice, but as a social phenomenon it is still too young to permit secure evaluation. Still, its very freshness tempts one to a few preliminary remarks.

Dolci's movement is not quite a party nor a trade union, a cooperative nor a mutual aid society – though it contains elements of all of these. Primarily it is an effort, through a sharing of troubles, to restore the sense of self-respect and the idea of the possibilities of the human to men who have lost or never had them. But the difficulty confronting Dolci is that this community, even as it is to be built from the materials of affection, must frequently adopt a combative pose, setting itself in sharp opposition to established institutions. And this means the danger of slowly taking over the methods and styles of one's opponents.

Dolci's movement is not, or not yet, designed to effect a transformation of society; it is not really a rebellion, but a resistance founded upon the principle that in modern society, despite its bureaucratic impersonality, there remain some free spaces in which men can act together in behalf of realizable goals. But the problem of resistance movements is always the problem of half-success: what shall they do once they begin to command some power, once the existing centers of authority recognize them as a force? Shall they negotiate with traditional agencies, thereby running the risk of absorption into the *status quo* and of dissipating the idealism of their followers, or shall they try to keep a posture of intransigeance, thereby approaching a condition of sacred or utopian impotence?

In a first-rate article about Dolci's movement which appeared last February in *Commentary*, Kathleen Nott reports that she asked Dolci "whether in view of the enormous strength of reaction in Sicily, he could not expect at some point to meet with a revolutionary situation which could not be side-stepped and which also could not be met by non-violent methods." Dolci answered her, she writes, "I thought at the time, illogically, even evasively; indeed what he said to me – 'Go and look at this place' – seemed no answer at all." But Miss Nott had the good sense to add in her article: "I now see that Dolci could not have answered me in any other way. To have given an answer one way or the other about the future, as it might be determined by his opponents, would be doing a kind of violence to that present which he is trying to initiate."

The point is important, since Dolci's whole effort depends upon creating that preliminary atmosphere of good faith among his people which requires that they decide to forego the promiscuous violence which has so long been a curse of Sicilian life. But there is an even more important point. One reason for caring about Dolci's work is that it does not start with the familiar assumptions of the usual political movements, even those one agrees with. It seeks to create *a beginning as a mode of existence*, but it does not dogmatically assert, in the manner of some pacifists, that doing this is an adequate basis for the next step. What the next step may be, no one quite knows. The very absence of ideology which has been so refreshing an aspect of Dolci's work may yet prove to be a serious weakness; but to foresee possibilities of trouble is not to deny the value of what has already been done.

The great virtue of Dolci's movement is that it breaks with the feeling that politics has become a specialized craft to be left to professionals and institutions. Dolci is trying to imbue the Sicilians with the idea of local and immediate action; soon enough they will realize that in the twentieth century this must bring them into a tense relation with the state; but meanwhile, like the Negro demonstrators in the South, they are discovering the value of personal assertion. And this is a lesson that, if it must be learned by the Sicil-

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ians, should be recalled by ourselves. For the challenge offered by Dolci's example – I return again to Camus' question – is not so much a saintliness with or without God, but the possibility of an active goodness open to anyone, a "saintliness" for which one need be no more than a man.

A Gentle Wind from Capitol Hill

by Asher Brynes

Seven years ago, Mr. Flanders of Vermont – then 74 years old – rose on the floor of the Senate to address his junior colleague, McCarthy of Wisconsin. This is perfectly proper under Senatorial procedure – and in Senatorial language, Mr. Flanders proceeded to show that it is possible to talk plenty of plain English through the verbal scrollwork. "To what party does he [Senator McCarthy] belong? Is he a hidden satellite of the Democratic party, to which he furnishes so much material for quiet mirth?"

Senator from Vermont
by Ralph E. Flanders
(Little, Brown; $5)

After probing this question in a vein of ponderous fun, Senator Flanders answered his own inquiry. "One must conclude that he is a one-man party, and that its name is 'McCarthyism', a title which he has proudly accepted." He went on to complain of the "clatter and hullabaloo" of McCarthy's operations. "He dons his war paint. He goes into his war dance. He emits his war whoops. He goes forth to battle and proudly returns with the scalp of a pink Army dentist . . . [but] the dangerous attack is from without, not from within . . . let him not so work as to conceal the mortal danger in which our country finds itself from the external enemies of mankind." Then Senator Flanders ended this peroration by intoning the battle hymn of his faith:

> Christian, up and smite them,
> Counting gain but loss;
> Smite them, Christ is with thee,
> Soldier of the cross.

It may sound corny, but from this time forward the fortunes of the junior Senator from Wisconsin went steadily downhill. Finally, after much cloakroom haggling, a group of Senators led by Flanders steeled themselves sufficiently to introduce a resolution charging McCarthy with "contempt of his fellows" – an action to which Flanders indirectly refers as in "the highest traditions of the most august legislative body in the world." Such stuffiness marches along with much solid accomplishment in this homespun chronicle.

The book opens, for instance, like *Tristram Shandy*. There are several chapters describing the time before the author was born in order to establish the fact that he is the fruit of an old family tree. Upon emerging in this world he discovered that his people were poor and respectable, in the New England style. He grew up shy with girls, which is perhaps why he gives the rules, in full detail, of the kissing games that boys and girls played when he was young.

He had a classical education, four years of Latin and three of Greek in the high schools of the area and since his family could not afford to send him on to college he was apprenticed to Brown and Sharpe, the most famous builders of machine tools in the country. Although such tools had been, for the most part, developed in the 18th and early 19th Centuries in England as a concomitant of the Industrial Revolution, the leadership in this field had passed to the United States about ten years before the Civil War. When Bismarck was tooling up Prussia's arms factories, for instance, just before the carefully-planned string of wars – first with Denmark, then with Austria, and finally with France – out of which he forged the fire-breathing German Reich, he sent a purchasing mission to New England. The needle guns (historic precursors of the famous Mauser) with which the German infantry subjected the French to a dose of Bismarckian blood-and-iron in 1870 were made on machines imported from Rhode Island.

Flanders entered this lively Yankee business, hell-bent for advancement. He became intensely interested in such things as gear cutting, which used to be done by rule of thumb. "Anything which could not be analyzed offended my mechanical instincts. . . . The problem lay like a dead weight on my memory, and I finally solved it by measuring the cutter at the pitch line, and calculating therefrom the offset." The Senator introduces much other material from his machine-shop days, always abruptly and without the least explanation that might be intelligible to outsiders. He is still, apparently, so much at home in this business that it is hard for him to imagine he must spend extra time instructing the laity in what it's all about.

His immersion in technology led him into writing articles for the trade magazines; finally he became an editor of *Machinery*. He met the redoubtable Henry Taylor, the first of the long line of American efficiency experts and the father of scientific management, who sought to recruit him as one of the pioneering disciples of the new technology of production. Flanders' reasons for turning down the invitation were characteristically shrewd and simple. The basis of Taylor's approach was the insistence that there was *one best way* to do anything in a factory. Flanders wrote to tell him that he doubted that such a thing could be finally determined. "I was in fact convinced that the *one best way* would be succeeded by a better way, and that in turn by a still better, and that the best would never be reached."

This is the gist of the Senator's secular philosophy. It is what has made him a pragmatic conservative rather

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than a die-hard. Another bit of wisdom to which he lays no explicit claim, however, is a knowledge of his own limitations. The year 1956, he says at one point, "witnessed two of my rare legislative achievements." He was able to get an appropriation to finish the Federal fish hatchery at Holden, Vermont, in one operation instead of stringing it over a series of years, as before. And the second accomplishment was to convince the Congress to establish Federal research into hardwood, "the orphan child of forestry."

His final year in the Senate (1958) was a blank. None of his projects came to fruition, he says, but then adds quickly that it was a year of unfinished business rather than of failure. He bequeaths one useful hint to his successors, who will surely have to work their way through as many Washington cocktail parties:

> "Experience is a useful teacher [so] I am venturing to pass on a means of self-preservation . . . . In a firm and manly tone ask the barkeeper for a 'gin and tonic'. In a discreet whisper tell him, 'leave out the gin'. No one can tell that you are not indulging. Besides that, quinine in soda water with a little squeeze of lime is a really refreshing drink."

Like many of Senator Flanders' formulas this one is so well known to old hands, barkeepers and quaffers alike, that no whispering is required. Besides, who could hear a whispering man at a Washington cocktail party? The Senator's sense of sin is showing.

Did Kennedy Win or did Nixon Lose?

by Gerald W. Johnson

James Michener had a roaring good time knocking himself out for Kennedy last year. Such, at least, is the impression left by this hilarious, but very astute, analysis of the election.

Michener actually was the Bucks County, Pennsylvania, chairman of Citizens for Kennedy, and so functioned in the early days of the campaign; but he wound up a county chairman in the sense that Dwight D. Eisenhower is a man-at-arms, Earl Warren a magistrate, and Cardinal Spellman a priest – he was a county chairman plus. For one thing, his county seat remained Doylestown, Pennsylvania, but he was operating in Denver, Boise City and way-stations, which doesn't happen to run-of-the-mine county politicians. For another, the moment the election was over Michener reverted to his character of a man of letters observing and recording the life of his times; and it is that capacity that he renders this report.

Report of the County Chairman
by James A. Michener
(Random House; $3.95)

To dispose first of its literary quality: it is Michener at his brightest and best. It is uproariously funny, but it isn't a joke book. There are pages recording with painful realism the tedium, the frustration, the bone-crushing fatigue, all that Carter Dickson's hero summed up as "the godawful cussedness of things," inseparable from a hard campaign. If merriment survives as the final impression of the book it is on balance. It is not a sugary confection.

To me, however, its literary quality yields precedence to its importance as a historical document. I believe that Michener explains more of what really happened in 1960 than all the solemn and ponderous analysts. He asserts flatly that Kennedy didn't win the election, Nixon lost it, and escaped being buried under a landslide only because religious prejudice operated against Kennedy to a very formidable extent. Rockefeller, a Protestant, would have massacred Kennedy.

Michener's contribution to political history is the evidence he adduces that the old party war-horses who controlled the Republican convention knew this at the time. But they also knew that to win with Rockefeller would mean losing control of the party; and your old party war-horse would rather retain control than win the White House. Not until the Democrats took the chance of nominating a Catholic did the war-horses begin to think that Nixon might have a chance; and even then they were not enthusiastic.

The curious apathy of Eisenhower puzzles Michener, who thinks that a vigorous campaign by the President would have elected Nixon. Maybe. But the transfer of personal popularity is rarely possible. Right at the end Eisenhower did come out vigorously, but Michener thinks it was then too late. Perhaps it never could have been done; but by a strong campaign, Eisenhower might have compromised his own position without saving the election.

Here is one of the few commentators with the grace to admit that at the start he misjudged the importance of the religious issue. Even yet he has not realized clearly that a large part of it – and by long odds the more dangerous part – is only incidentally anti-Catholic; primarily it is anti-clerical, objecting not to Catholic faith and dogma, but to theological interference in secular politics, in which the record of the Catholic church is as bad as that of the Methodists when Bishop Cannon was in his heyday, or of the Baptists when the Rev. Frank (Two-Gun) Norris was startling Texas and indoctrinating the young John Birch.

For Michener to be vague on this point is perhaps unimportant, but if Kennedy fails to grasp it the results may be serious. For what operated against him last November was religious, not personal prejudices; and if he repels every clerical effort to control his policy the intelligent who stayed at home last November will support him as strongly as they would any Protestant. As for the unintelligent, nothing can be done about them anyhow.

Among professional politicians this book is likely to be received with some disfavor. Michener tells too much. But for that very reason the non-professional should not only read it, but study it with care. For this is not the usual diluted and sweetened partisan propaganda in which the truth is overlaid and disguised with popular flavors; this is the reverend stuff.

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

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

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TELEVISION

A Basketful of Laurels

The Emmy Awards made television look better than it is. The leading winners among the performers were not native television folk at all but veterans of other branches of show business – Dame Judith Anderson, Maurice Evans, Fred Astaire, Jack Benny, Barbara Stanwyck, Roddy McDowell. The lineup sounds like a list of nominees for the Academy Awards of 1938. By '38 all of them were established stars. And among the winning scripts was material by two non-TV celebrities, William Shakespeare and Winston Churchill.

But though the Emmy Awards did not disprove all the unflattering things that have been said lately about TV programming, they showed that the medium does have its moments, for the programs honored were, by and large, distinguished. The Hallmark Hall of Fame production of *Macbeth* accounted for five separate awards, including one for the sponsor – and by whatever standards, the Anderson-Evans *Macbeth* was good theater; the recognition was well deserved.

The doubly honored *Astaire Time*, for its part, was a stylish sample of song-and-dance perfectionism. And Leonard Bernstein, rewarded both for his CBS appearances with the New York Philharmonic and a Young People's Concert *Aaron Copland's Birthday Party*, brought another kind of distinction to the medium, as did the winning documentary *Winston Churchill, The Valiant Years*.

In the news department, Chet Huntley and David Brinkley walked off with the honors, to no one's surprise. I know about the criticism made of these two – they are too cool, too flip, and Brinkley tends to get a bit too twinkly at times. But after all those years of solemn CBS punditry – all those announcements issued from *below* the diaphragm – I am not ready to complain. Brinkley can get as cute as Dobie Gillis if he wants to, just so *he* doesn't start thinking he is Edward Gibbon.

Actually, I believe Huntley-Brinkley are the best thing that has happened to TV since Pinky Lee retired. Their success augured well for the new political style JFK brought to American politics. They were low-key and downbeat when certain unreconstructed children of the depression were writing bitter articles saying they could not dig Kennedy because he lacked passion and conviction. Huntley and Brinkley exemplified the drawing power of the low-pressure approach before Kennedy appeared on the national scene. I figured at the time that if the nation could warm up to these two newsmen, the Kennedy style would finally get across, too.

I suppose one should say a word about the Emmy given to Barbara Stanwyck for her regular series – but what is there to say? There may be some difference between the June Allyson show, the Loretta Young show, the Barbara Stanwyck show, and the show of whoever else has one like this. What the awards to them amount to, I suspect, is an expression of affection for the star whose turn has come up. This year it was Miss Stanwyck; next year it may be Loretta Young.

At the Emmy Awards a special word of commendation was given to the industry for the part TV played during the 1960 Presidential campaign. Both Kennedy and Nixon were praised for their willingness to meet face to face for the great debates. I think I am one of a tiny minority on this whole question. Kennedy was my candidate in 1960, and he profited immeasurably from the debates. Therefore I have no regrets that the debates were held. But is it such a wonderful thing that both candidates should be talking about the same issues? Isn't it the heart of a political contest that different candidates have different ideas of what the key issues of the campaign are? Can a candidate bound to the debate format during his major appearances lay out his own map for the future and develop his own thought, establish his own way of approaching a problem.

I have other difficulties. Doesn't the debate format put an undue emphasis on the quick retort and flashy response, and give too little to the reply that takes full consideration of the complexity of a situation?

Finally, just what is so magical about a face-to-face confrontation? Should it have been so important that Mr. Nixon, during the first debate with Kennedy, looked bad? Obviously it weakened his support. But should it have? Was the political program Nixon stood for any better or worse because the camera was cruel to him and kind to Kennedy? Doesn't this sort of thing bring theatrical values into our political life that do not belong there? Soon after his election, President Kennedy said he would welcome debates during the 1964 elections, but from the tone of things at the Emmy Awards I suspect the pressures on any candidate to meet his opponent before the cameras will be practically irresistible.

JOHN COGLEY

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THEATER

Genet's Call to the Colors

The Blacks
by Jean Genet
(St. Marks Playhouse)

Considering the fact that *The Blacks* is a ritual of murder, violence, and crime, enacted by Negro supremacists, and culminating in the ceremonious slaughter of the entire White race, its thunderous success here is really rather astonishing. One woud hardly be surprised if Genet's celebration of race hatred found favor with an audience of Black Muslims; but the play is now being praised by the same liberal community which so heartily applauded *Raisin in the Sun* for its moderation, charity, and racial togetherness. It could be, of course, that *The Blacks* has simply been misunderstood – after all, the *Times* reviewer seemed to interpret the work as a plea for inter-racial harmony. Then, again, perhaps the insularity of our stage is so complete that nobody cares what a play says as long as it fulfills the aesthetic requirements of "good theater." I am inclined to opt, hopefully, for a third possibility: namely, that audiences have become so surfeited with the liberalistic pieties, platitudes, and exhortations always mouthed in American plays about Negroes that they are finally open to a more radical treatment of race, one closer to the uncensored stuff of dreams than to the official doctrines of the NAACP. Whatever the explanation, *The Blacks* is a depth charge of evil which sinks the spectator well below the placid surface of social benevolence to the dark sea floor of the unconscious, leaving him totally submerged beneath a torrent of primitive impulses, sado-masochistic hallucinations, and myths of danger. As such, the play may do a great deal of harm to the cause of inter-race relations, but it is cut to order for that alchemical theater of cruelty envisioned by Antonin Artaud where the spectator's "taste for crime, his erotic obsessions, his savagery, his chimeras . . . even his cannibalism" would be vicariously indulged, and, thereby, momentarily purged.

Genet's genius for cruel myth-making is evident from the opening moments of the play when eight Negroes and Negresses, dressed in the height of flouncy elegance, begin dancing a stately minuet around a catafalque supposedly containing the corpse of a white woman, freshly killed for the performance. These are the props and actors in a ritual rehearsal of an earlier murder, to be re-enacted by the murderer, Deodatus Village, and judged by a White Court consisting of the Great Figures of European colonialism: Queen, Queen's valet, Judge, Missionary, and Governor. The entire affair, however (including the corpse which later turns to be non-existent) is a fake – a masquerade performed by ritual celebrants who keep their true identity carefully concealed. For the actors (all of them Europeanized Negroes in middle class professions) are determined to expose not their individual lives but their collective racial identity: the Blacks by "negrifying" themselves "to the point of madness in what they're condemned to be," and the Whites (Negroes in masks) by satirically celebrating, through hyper-cultured postures and inflections, the various triumphs of European civilization. Consistent with these roles, the Blacks labor to caricature or suppress all "white" ideas like love and tenderness, intensifying their atavistic poetry, savagery, and cannibalism, and finding their meaning solely through acts of hatred and revenge, while the Whites preside over the events from a raised platform, contemplating their failing racial authority ("have courage, Madame, God is White"), exploiting Africa's resources and manpower, and covertly admiring Negro sexuality, spontaneity, and beauty.

Behind this stage ceremony, however, a series of real events – periodically and cryptically reported by a Messenger, appropriately named Newport News – is taking place offstage: first the trial and execution of a Negro traitor, and then the emergence of a new Black Hero to carry on the battle against White supremacy. The theatrical ritual, in short, exists only to mask secret preparations for a Negro uprising, but at the same time that it draws attention from these preparations, it predicts their outcome. For Village's murder of a Woman (played by a scapegoat Negro curate in blonde curls and a pasty mask) symbolizes the massacre of Europe by African hordes, the Woman being nothing less than the Mother of the White Race (before she is disembowelled, she gives birth to dolls representing all the Great Figures). Proceeding into the jungle to avenge this archetypal crime, the Great Figures are themselves exterminated, as a crowing cock signals the beginning of a new era. But Genet's theory of history is cyclical, and, as inevitably as night gives way to day, the Whites will return again in ten thousand years to renew the conflict. The play ends with a repetition of the minuet around the catafalque – this time without the

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Whites, the Black prophecy having been fulfilled and the ritualistic vision a mythic rite of a past historic event.

The Blacks no doubt sounds impossibly complicated, and perhaps the play is ultimately too dense and opaque to be called a totally successful work of art. Genet has a Pirandellian obsession with the idea that human identity is defined by play-acting; and *The Blacks*, like *The Balcony* (which it resembles in so many other ways), examines the artificiality of human behavior in a world of rigid definitions. But whereas this philosophical probing enriched the vision of sham in *The Balcony*, it merely muddies the ritualistic line of *The Blacks*, and sometimes even produces puzzling contradictions (for example, at times the Negroes are enacting their own definition of Black, at other times, that of the White audience). Because of Genet's failure to integrate his conscious preoccupations with his unconscious fantasies, *The Blacks* remains an elusive enigma. But while it fails as a philosophical drama, it stands triumphant as a cruel purgative myth, enlivened by a fierce imagination, a rich theatrical sense, and some of the most superb imagery in all modern drama.

It is the fantastic, ritualistic element of the work that is best realized in Gene Frankel's production. Working with a scimitar-shaped ramp which leads from an open stage to a raised platform, Frankel has staged the play with an uncanny eye for handsome effects, and paced the scenes with a kind of voodoo frenzy to the accompaniment of jungle sounds, African chants, and native dances. Obviously, Mr. Frankel's stage technique is now impeccable, but his theatricalist emphasis does not help to clarify Genet's thematic line, and his actors – except for Roscoe Lee Browne and James Earl Jones – are not always very strong, or penetrating, or even well cast. On the other hand, this is surely the best production of a Genet work yet seen in New York – superior to Quintero's interpretation of *The Balcony* in that it is highly imaginative *without* sacrificing the text. As for this text, whatever its failings, it clearly displays the mind of a genius; and whatever the evil implications of the play, it is a welcome tonic for a theater where the Negro lacks any substantiality at all, being either transparent – which is to say, discernible only as an object of White guilt, prejudice, and benevolence – or totally invisible – which is to say, exactly the same as everyone else. In restoring to the Negro his high visibility, Genet inadvertently halts, if only for a moment, that inexorable process of mass assimilation which is draining the color from us all.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

Correspondence

The Cuban Fiasco

Sirs:

For some time it has been part of the liberal creed that the United States should try to align itself with the revolutionary forces in the modern world and guide them into democratic channels. I have always been skeptical about the prospects of taking the revolution away from the Communists because such a policy contradicted the requirements of both international *Realpolitik* and the structure of modern society. To expect even the most enlightened sectors of American big business to give serious support to revolutions against property in Asia and Latin America seems to me little short of fantastic. Nevertheless, as well-known liberals took leading positions in Washington, overtones from the liberal creed found their way into the doctrines of the New Frontier.

What can happen when this creed encounters political responsibility in today's circumstances we see only too clearly in the Cuban affair. Liberalism turns into a shabby fig-leaf for second-rate naked power politics. An Adlai Stevenson makes lame excuses to the international public; the Arthur Schlesingers and Adolf Berles run humiliating errands at home. As soon as the character of our protégés among the Cuban refugees became known, the liberal thesis that the US has nothing against social reform, but is irrevocably opposed to totalitarian Communism, began to look as silly as the claim that the government had nothing to do with the invasion. Nor will the administration mend matters if the CIA now

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throws its support behind a "liberal" wing of the Cuban refugees and marches them in behind the Marines, to be followed in due course by a massive program of economic aid. Castro's regime evidently has sufficient popular support to make a white terror indispensable for any replacement sponsored by the Americans.

Liberal rhetoric has also made its significant contribution to the unanimity of American opinion during the weeks following the invasion, a reaction that has been one of the most frightening aspects of the whole situation. After a few brief queries liberal congressmen subsided into support for the President, thus encouraging the illusion that the whole affair was a technical blunder, to be avoided in the future by a dose of administrative reorganization.

At first glance this unanimity seems startling. In the decades of its agony the Tsarist autocracy probably could not have acted so stupidly with so little public criticism. The fundamental explanation may be that the threat of war has become the spark plug that keeps our economy going and our country unified, a statement that I believe applies very much to the Soviets as well. In our case, however, the destructive machinery still generates enough prosperity to make the active repression of dissent nearly superfluous. Who cares (or even knows) about Cuba, or the real origin of the pay check as long as it continues to arrive? Recent events give further support to the thesis that we live in an historically new variety of garrison state: one that covers its actual policies with liberal rhetoric and minor concessions to numerically important interest groups such as the Negroes and organized labor.

If this is true, or were to become true, the traditions of parliamentary and academic debate will no longer provide an adequate framework of action and discussion for those who have a commitment to freedom. These traditions presuppose a social order in which all who are qualified to hold an opinion may speak out vigorously with a reasonable expectation of convincing others who share an equal regard for truth and reason. Such a situation has at best only been approximated in the past, while many forces in the present century have worked to destroy it. Nevertheless, there comes a point, when to behave as though this order still existed merely becomes a ritual form of self-deception.

I should like to believe that we have not yet reached this point, though I fear that we are dreadfully close to it. If reasoned alternatives to our present system do not gain greater attention in the arena of public debate, then the debate *is* a pseudo-debate – and totalitarianism will have triumphed without firing a shot on American soil.

Barrington Moore, Jr.
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Sirs:

How easy it is to jump on a fellow when he's down! I deplore the letters in *NR*, May 15, from Eric Bentley of Harvard, Eduardo Reyes, Avrom Greenberg and Richard Du Boff, with their "holier than thou" attitude about the Cuban fiasco, and their brickbats thrown at the President. That the President made a mistake, which no one regrets more than he, is evident. Neither I nor anyone else needs to be told. These letters commit the second crime of being superfluous.

What we do need is a creative analysis of foreign policy in light of past mistakes. Why not beam the searchlight on our best hope for such a policy: the recently created US Citizens Commission on NATO, with its directive to invite citizens delegates from other NATO countries to meet in a convention to discuss closer economic and political unity among countries where government comes closest to being the voice of the governed? If an Atlantic Economic Confederation, with membership open to other countries meeting the conditions, is proposed and eventually adopted, then our Latin American neighbors will have more solid basis for higher living standards and more faith in our interest in freedom through freer trade than any money gifts or support of dispossessed refugees will ever give them. This is what we ought to applaud and to publicize.

Ellen Garwood,
Austin, Texas

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

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